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SECURITY PROBLEMS - LONG RANGE PLANNING 1965

The Office of Security is constantly striving to improve security in all of its fields. Technical developments, sociological change, and possible realignment of international forces will require changes in our security techniques and procedures. These unique problems must be met with a high degree of sophistication in the security field. Some of the future problems can be identified by manifestations appearing at this time. Others cannot. Accordingly, this paper will address itself to future security problems which are either with us at the present time and will continue to be problems, or those which can be anticipated with some degree of certainty.

I. Investigations and Operational Support

1. As a result of recent writings on the "invasion of privacy" there has developed a noticeable reluctance on the part of persons interviewed during the course of investigations to furnish information about, or even identify, the persons known to them who are being investigated. This reluctance has also manifested itself in the refusal by some university officials to make available documents and information pertinent to personnel security investigations. It is contemplated that this will be a continuing problem which will become even more pronounced in future years. These circumstances will require the development of new investigative techniques and additional sources of information. In this regard, the Office of Security has a senior officer working

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2. The conduct of inter-agency name checks will, in the future, be made through the medium of automatic data processing equipment. This anticipated development will require long range planning on the part of the Office of Security in order that we may reap the benefits from such automated developments, but at the same time protect the security of Agency information and sources.

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## II. Physical Security

1. The physical protection of CIA installations and personnel abroad will be a continuing problem. The prominent power position of the U. S. will continue to subject its overseas personnel to increased numbers of demonstrations, riots, or acts of violence together with their attendant security problems. Long range planning must take this into account in order to provide additional security on a continuing "in-place" basis. 1965 (1.0)

2. The ever increasing cost of guard protection of Agency buildings should be reduced through the use of technological advances in the field of personal identification. It is anticipated that by continuing effort, the state of the art in this field can be advanced so as to yield the desired security results. Automatic and instantaneous fingerprint processing is one of possibilities toward the achievement of this security goal.

## III. Counterintelligence

Within the framework of a "bi-polar" world power structure, considerable emphasis in the security field has been given to the threats presented by the currently identified -- Communist oriented -- opposition. Security techniques, practices and procedures must be sensitive to any new penetration efforts on the part of other nations which may affect the security of the Agency. Necessary security measures must be developed on a timely basis in order to meet any new, developing threats. In cooperation with the CI Staff, DDP, necessary security measures must be developed on a timely basis in order to meet any new developing threats. 1965 (1m)

## IV. Polygraph

1. There has been much congressional interest in connection with the use of the polygraph. In this connection, the validity of the polygraph has been challenged and certain restrictions on its use are highly probable. Every effort must be made to permit the Agency to continue the use of this highly effective security asset. (1.2) 1965

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2. Appropriate research will be necessary in order to improve the security benefits which can be derived by stress measurements. It is felt that considerable advancement in the state of the art of the polygraph technique is possible.

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V. Industrial Security

Until the present time there has been little evidence of concerted opposition efforts to penetrate industrial facilities performing classified Government contracts. With the increased importance of technology in the intelligence field and with increased dependence by the intelligence community on industrial assistance, it is anticipated that opposition efforts in this connection will be materially increased. Future security policies, procedures and techniques must address themselves to this problem and produce the necessary security protection.

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VI. Technical Security

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VII. Personnel Security

In order for the Agency to stay abreast of new developments in the intelligence field it will be necessary to process security clearances in large numbers on a continuing basis. Increased efforts on the part of the opposition to penetrate CIA will require a continuing vast expenditure of manpower in order to yield the necessary degree of personnel security. Additional emphasis will be required to carry out a current reinvestigation program of staff employees, consultants and contractor personnel.

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VIII. Automatic Data Processing

All Office of Security programs must be geared so as to accrue the greatest benefits from automation. The most serious problem is the development of systems for the easy and effective in-put of security data into a format which can be automated and retrieved at a later date, compatible with the needs of all Agency components involved.

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IX. Protection of Intelligence

1. "Leaks of information" will continue to pose a threat to the protection of intelligence sources and methods. Efforts to combat such disclosures must continue to be exercised through the USIB, with continued emphasis upon the realization that the cooperation of all departments and agencies will be required to produce the necessary degree of success in this security effort.

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2. The degree of protection afforded classified information is only as strong as the lowest standards maintained within the recipient agencies. Recent revelations of espionage have shown that all agencies

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are affected by the penetration of any one community agency. CIA is, therefore, continually striving through the Security Committee of the United States Intelligence Board to develop uniform security criteria and standards for use by all member agencies in the intelligence community.

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